University of Louisville

ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
5-2018

Political activism and resistance in Irish America : the clan na gael
1912-1916.
Sara Bethany Bornemann
University of Louisville

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd
Part of the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Bornemann, Sara Bethany, "Political activism and resistance in Irish America : the clan na gael
1912-1916." (2018). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 2940.
https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/2940

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator
of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the author, who
has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu.

POLITICAL RESISTANCE AND ACTIVISM IN IRISH AMERICA:
THE CLAN NA GAEL 1912-1916
By
Sara Bethany Bornemann
B.A., Bridgewater State University, 2015

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Louisville
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Master of Arts
In History

Department of History
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky

May 2018

POLITICAL RESISTANCE AND ACTIVISM IN IRISH AMERICA:
THE CLAN NA GAEL 1912-1916

By
Sara Bornemann
B.A. [Bridgewater State University, 2015]

A Thesis Approved On

4/11/2018

By the following Thesis Committee

_______________________________________________
Dr. Theresa M. Keeley, Thesis Director
_______________________________________________
Dr. John E. McLeod
_______________________________________________
Dr. David T. Buckley

ii

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to Dr. Theresa M. Keeley, advisor extraordinaire.

To The Fianna
A message of cheer from the land of the West
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To the Feain of Erin, the hope of the Gael
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His spirit’s abroad in the country today
Tho’ youthful and few you are leading the way,
May you stand in the path with your rifle and spears
And hold it for Finn and the New Volunteers.
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ABSTRACT
POLITICAL RESISTANCE AND ACTIVISM IN IRISH AMERICA:
THE CLAN NA GAEL 1912-1916
Sara Bethany Bornemann
April 11, 2018
This thesis is a historical examination of a group of male Irish Americans, the
Clan na Gael, that sought Ireland’s independence from Britain during the years 19121916. This is a chronological study of the four years leading up to the Irish rebellion
known as the Easter Rising, but it is examined from the American side of the Atlantic.
The Clan na Gael was not successful politically, but had outsized influence financially on
the efforts to gain Ireland’s independence.
Analysis of primary source material makes the compelling argument that in
focusing on elite political actors, maintaining a vociferous public relations campaign, and
most importantly fundraising locally and regionally, the Clan exerted outsized influence
on the “Irish Question” in the years 1912-1916.
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INTRODUCTION

From 1866-1871, John Devoy was incarcerated in British jails for his part in
plotting an Irish rebellion against the British. In January of 1871, he was granted an early
release with four other Irish rebels, on condition of exile. Devoy and his compatriots all
chose America for their new home, but none ever stopped looking across the Atlantic
towards Ireland. Devoy was 29, he had a fine mind and compelling journalistic abilities.
But his best talent was organizing and mobilizing on behalf of Irish independence. His
past efforts on its behalf were hardly set aside, for just as soon as Devoy landed in New
York City, he immediately set about reestablishing and renewing a badly demoralized
Irish nationalist movement in America. Devoy had no idea that he would live in America
until his death in 1929. Devoy’s legacy stretched from the Fenian past of the Victorian
Age to a twentieth century resurgent rebel movement that culminated in the Easter
Rebellion in Dublin 1916. Devoy was the heart, soul, motor, brains and brawn of the Irish
independence movement in America.
The Fenian Brotherhood was an Irish and Irish American republican group that
operated through the middle part of the nineteenth century in America and in Ireland. The
Clan na Gael, an Irish American nationalist group, came into existence with the demise
of the Fenians in the late 1870s. The Clan na Gael was ultimately more successful than
the Fenian Brotherhood for a number of reasons, chief among them steady leadership,
better organizational apparatus, and a commitment to Ireland’s independence that did

1

promote terror tactics. In fact, the Clan na Gael initiative that failed most spectacularly
was its one foray into terrorism: the “Dynamite Wars” of the 1880s targeted British
infrastructure, and military and political leaders. A faction of Clan leadership supported
“any means necessary” to secure Irish independence, including the use of dynamite at
civilian institutions. Current historians argue that the “Dynamite Wars” conducted by the
Clan were the first modern examples of terrorism.1 The schism that developed as a result
of this policy illuminated the Clan membership’s general distrust of terrorist tactics to
further Irish nationalist hopes, and the Clan na Gael weeded out the members responsible
for the policy. Emerging from the split stronger, Clan na Gael leadership ushered in the
twentieth century with new strategies: to continue to fund Ireland’s domestic nationalist
efforts like the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the Clan’s sister organization in Ireland.
The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) also reconstituted itself from Fenian remnants.
The IRB was also a secret, oath-bound organization dedicated to an independent,
democratic Ireland. The Clan na Gael in America sought to promote Irish national pride
groups like the Gaelic League, and to center their activism around head of state actors
who could influence Anglo-American foreign policy to better effect Irish independence.
The second decade of the twentieth century was momentous for Irish nationalist hopes,
and the Clan na Gael rode a rising tide of international support for the hopes of a free and
independent Ireland. In particular, the years from 1912-1916 illuminate the highs and

See Lindsay Clutterbuck, “The Progenitors of Terrorism: Russian Revolutionaries or
Extreme Irish Republicans?” Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 16, Issue 1
(2004) and Niall Whehelan, The Dynamiters: Irish Nationalism and Political Violence in
the Wider World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) and Joseph McKenna,
The Irish American Dynamite Campaign: a history, 1881-1896, (Jefferson, N.C.:
McFarland & Company, 2012)
1
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The Clan na Gael, risen from the Fenian Brotherhood’s ashes, assumed the
mantle of activism for Irish nationalist efforts in America. While the Clan na Gael is
underrepresented in the current historiography, one can weave together tangential
characters and narratives to discover a faithful representation of its activities and
motivations. Irish American history is a popular and fruitful topic for historians.
Whatever the cause for the abundance of examinations of Irish history, this study joins
the ranks, with one crucial departure. This is not a study of an evolving Irish American
nationalism, nor is it a study of British perfidy and Irish martyrdom. This examination
looks at a specific group of Irish Americans, and their actions in the four-year period
leading up to the Easter Rising of 1916. The Clan’s actions in this four-year period is
neglected in the historiography. Thus, this research project focuses exclusively on the
Clan na Gael, a secret, oath-bound group of male Irish Americans who aggressively
sought Ireland’s independence from Britain. For this research project, I ask: how did the
Clan na Gael affect Irish American public opinion in the years 1912-1916? The Clan na
Gael’s focus on moving the dial of Irish American public opinion ultimately led to
greater success in attaining their goal of Irish independence. Although world events
proved to be the crucial tipping point, I argue that the ground game that Clan na Gael
leadership pursued in 1912-1916 created more pressure for Irish independence efforts.
From 1912-1916, the Clan na Gael maintained this pressure, and at the end of World
War I, a fundamentally altered international scene joined Irish nationalists in agitating for
Irish independence. Although Irish independence was far from assured, it was clear that
the Clan na Gael’s participation financially and politically contributed to the epochal
shift in public opinion. By focusing on elite political actors, maintaining a vociferous
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public relations campaign, and most importantly fundraising locally and regionally, the
Clan exerted outsized influence on the “Irish Question” in the years 1912-1916. Through
the efforts of John Devoy and the Clan na Gael in those years, Irish American opinion
and the Irish American Roman Catholic hierarchy were persuaded that only an
independent, republican Ireland was an acceptable political solution to the “Irish
question.”
Ireland was formally bound to Britain in the Acts of Union (1801). The creation
of the United Kingdom was determined by the wholesale practice of patronage and
peerage in Ireland. In order to pass the legislation, Irish legislators agreed to vote
themselves out of existence: 83 Irish boroughs were disenfranchised, and the remaining
33 were reduced to one-member seats.1 Financial disbursements of over one million
pounds were distributed throughout the disenfranchised boroughs, and peerages were
created on a grand scale. With the new parliamentary set-up, Ireland was formally a
junior partner in the relationship with Britain. This could be seen clearly in Britain’s
economic relationship with Ireland. Industrialization replaced the foundering cottonspinning industry in Northern Ireland, and new industries like ship-building and shirtmaking helped to propel the North into a more integrated economic position with
Britain.2 The agricultural Southern Irish counties were less fortunate, and relied on small
lots and subsistence crops to maintain a bleak existence. Cash crops were raised and
exported to Britain to create the necessary hard currency to pay the rack rents extorted by

1

www.historyofparliamentonline.org, “The Union with Ireland, 1800,” accessed 7
January 2018,
2
Charles Callan Tansill, America and the Fight For Irish Freedom, 1866-1922: An Old
Story Based On New Data, (New York: The Devon-Adair Company, 1957), 9
4

landlords. By the mid-1800s, Ireland was ripe for economic disaster. The Potato Famine
of the 1840s provided it.
Devastation stalked the Irish countryside. Insufficient British relief efforts
indicate that there was a willful indifference to the Irish dying by the millions. One
incontrovertibly successful relief measure, releasing Ireland from her exports to Britain,
was deemed “economic interference.”3 Had Ireland been able to keep her cash crops and
use them for feeding her people throughout the failed potato crop years, Ireland would
not have suffered the catastrophic loss of life through starvation and emigration. Yet even
as the Irish starved, a new nationalism was being born.
Rebellious Irishmen like Thomas Francis Meager, Gavan Duffy, and John Mitchel
were not content with a passive voice in Parliament, for they believed “the Irish people
have a first and indefeasible right to this island and to all moral and material wealth and
resources thereof, to possess and govern the same for their own use, maintenance and
comfort and honour as a sovereign state.”4 Such rhetoric was deemed high treason by the
British government, and those Irish nationalists who professed such beliefs were tried and
sentenced to serve hard terms. Those who escaped prosecution often fled to America,
where they nursed and fed their resistance to English rule through the creation of
societies like the Irish Republican Brotherhood and the Fenian Brotherhood.
In Dublin March 1858, James Stephens founded the Irish Republican Brotherhood
(IRB) at the behest of Irish republicans now exiled in America. Stephens’ IRB was reliant
on funds raised by Irish agitators in America- a continuum of financial dependence that

3

Tansill, America and the Fight For Irish Freedom, 1866-1922, 20
John Mitchel, The United Irishman, in Tansill, American and the Fight For Irish
Freedom, 1866-1922, 23
4
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was never ameliorated during the years of the fight for Irish independence. The American
wing of the IRB, called the Fenian Brotherhood, began operations in April 1859. Both the
IRB and Fenians were republican organizations- they believed in a sovereign Irish state.
However, another breed of Irish nationalism was actually more dominant throughout the
middle and late 1800s: a more moderate ideology that recognized the Irish language and
culture as distinct yet equal to Anglo culture, but did not see total separation from the
United Kingdom as immediately necessary. The conflict between republicanism and
nationalism in Ireland and in Irish America remained a theme well into the twentieth
century.
The Fenian Brotherhood in America suffered from a variety of ills: although it
was a secret organization, it was littered with informers. The military endeavors of the
Fenians were all failures, and even Irish American opinion soon soured on the
organization. But the Fenian Brotherhood was staffed and led by some very able Irish
republicans, and they kept the flame of Irish independence alive even as the Fenian
Brotherhood subsided into ashes. The remnants of the Fenians were incorporated into a
new organization aimed at securing Irish independence: the Clan na Gael.
The Clan na Gael (Clan) was led by former Fenians John Devoy and Jeremiah
O’Donovan Rossa, and younger men such as Daniel Cohalan and Joseph McGarrity. A
split in the Clan leadership in the 1880s over the use of dynamite as a terror tactic in
Britain and Dublin was reconciled by 1900, and the newly recoupled Clan pledged “the
complete independence of the Irish people, and the establishment of an Irish republic.”5 It
must be noted, however, that the Clan did not abhor physical force; the leadership just

5

Tansill, America and the Fight For Irish Freedom,1866-1922, 121
6

did not believe in the use of terror tactics that resulted in civilian casualties. Thus, the
Clan also vowed “physical force is the only engine a revolutionary organization can
consistently and successfully use to realize the hopes of lovers of freedoms in lands
subject to the bonds of oppression.”
The first decade of the twentieth century laid the groundwork for the political and
financial exertions the Clan undertook in the years of this study. In particular, the
campaign to fight Home Rule in Ireland assumed massive importance for the Clan. Home
Rule in Ireland meant the devolution of local affairs into local management, and would
grant an Irish parliament to manage and legislate for the Irish. It was a federal solution,
and Home Rule “permitted the accommodation of local, distinct groups within the
context of a broader political framework. In this condition, groups could maintain their
identity while retaining the political and economic benefits of a larger political unit- in
this case, the British Empire.”6 Needless to say, any political association with Britain and
the Empire that did not recognize Ireland’s total autonomy was anathema to the Clan na
Gael. Home Rule Bill 3 passed Parliament in 1912, but the implementation of the bill
stalled under the weight of the opposition to it. Ironically, the most strenuous opposition
to Home Rule came from within Ireland: the Ulster Unionist Party flatly rejected any
form of political separation from Britain. The Ulster Unionists proposed an “exclusion”
of four northern Irish counties from the proposed Home Rule parliament. Political
separation from Britain was an abomination to the Ulster Unionists, but exclusion of any
part of Ireland was equally abhorrent to John Redmond’s Irish Party. For Redmond and

6

Joseph P. Finnan, John Redmond and Irish Unity, 1912-1918, (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 2004), 38
7

the Irish Party, Home Rule meant all of Ireland. For the Clan, Home Rule was a bandage
when amputation was necessary. The Clan exploited the interim between passage and
implementation of Home Rule, and were aided and abetted by the advent of World War I.
There is a surprising lack of focus on what Irish American groups did to maintain
a spotlight on their homeland from the safety of the western side of the Atlantic. Studies
that do focus on Irish American nationalist efforts have emphasized the Fenian
Brotherhood’s role. As well, the narrative of the Irish immigrant experience has been
thoroughly examined in Kerby Miller’s Emigrants and Exiles,7 and Thomas N. Brown’s
Irish-American Nationalism, 1870-1890.8 These two benchmark studies have provided a
base for future scholarship in Irish American histories. Allusions to the activities of the
Clan abound in histories of Irish American nationalism, and many scholars utilize the
memoirs of the main actors, but no one has scrutinized only the Clan during these years.
There exists no extended treatment of the Clan, no scholarly examination, and no studies
of the specific years mentioned. In order to understand the Irish American opposition to
entrance into World War One, and hostility towards Home Rule in Ireland, an
investigation into the Clan na Gael’s leadership, rank and file, and activism during the
years of 1912-1916 is crucial.
John Devoy’s autobiography provides the meta-narrative for the Clan, but ends
with the Easter Rising of 1916; also, the stopping point for this project.9 The official

Kerby A. Miller, Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America,
(New York: Oxford University Press) 1988
8 Thomas N. Brown, Irish American Nationalism, 1870-1890, (New York: J.B.
Lippincott) 1966
9
John Devoy, Recollections of an Irish Rebel: The Fenian Movement. It’s Origins and
Progress. Methods of Work in Ireland and in the British Army. Why It Failed To Achieve
Its Main Object, But Exercised Great Influence on Ireland’s Future. Personalities of the
7

8

record of events closely aligns with Devoy’s. Every scholar has utilized Devoy’s
autobiography as a source: either directly through his “Recollections,” or indirectly via
his editorial voice in the pages of the Gaelic American, the Irish nationalist periodical in
New York City. Devoy’s Recollections are an obvious starting point for research on the
Clan na Gael: as the acknowledged leader of the group, Devoy’s perspective is critical in
understanding the “hows” and “whys” of the Clan’s objectives and how they pursued
them.
Terry Golway’s Irish Rebel: John Devoy and America’s Fight For Ireland’s
Freedom biography is the only current scholarly examination of John Devoy, and
therefore becomes a primer of Irish American nationalism and specifically the Clan na
Gael.10 It reads like a novel, but is nonetheless carefully researched. This monograph
traces the whole arc of Devoy’s life, and his unflagging activism on behalf of Irish
independence. Less hagiographical and more critical, Sean Cronin’s The McGarrity
Papers- Revelations of the Irish Revolutionary Movement in Ireland and America 19001940 provides a complementary narrative.11 Joseph McGarrity was also part of the Clan
na Gael’s Executive Council- and worked in tandem with Devoy to agitate for Irish
independence. Both McGarrity and Devoy were inexhaustible correspondents, and much
of the primary source material in this research project comes from their communications.
Cronin does not hesitate to highlight McGarrity’s divergences with Devoy- specifically

Organization. The Clan-na-Gael and the Rising of Easter Week, 1916. A Personal
Narrative by John Devoy. (New York City: Charles P. Young) 1929
Terry Golway, Irish Rebel: John Devoy and America’s Fight For Ireland’s Freedom,
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998)
11
Sean Cronin, The McGarrity Papers-Revelations of the Irish Revolutionary Movement
in Ireland and America 1900-1940, (Tralee: Anvil Press, 1972)
10
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McGarrity’s faith in Sir Roger Casement, a knight of the British Empire who became one
of the Irish nationalists’ most famous champions. Overall, McGarrity and Devoy were
remarkably unified in their leadership of the Clan na Gael- but the small differences
between them serve to underscore the complexities of the organization’s management.
David Sim’s A Union Forever details the conflicts and resolutions in AngloAmerican diplomatic relations in the Victorian age, arguing that Irish American
nationalists inadvertently knitted England and America’s diplomatic relationship closer
together, rather that tearing them apart.12 This theme of unintended consequences
replayed again in the early twentieth century, but this time the Irish American nationalists
benefitted: as I argue in this thesis. To read Sim’s study is to learn of early failures for
Irish American nationalists, but most importantly, it introduces the cast of what became
the future Clan na Gael: many of the early Clan na Gael leaders were the original
Fenians featured in Sims’ monograph.
William D’Arcy’s The Fenian Movement in the U.S., 1858-1886 traces the Fenian
Brotherhood from its inception until its final gasp in 1886. 13 Because so many members
of the Clan na Gael were initially either members or at least contributors to the Fenian
Brotherhood, it is useful to examine the Fenians more closely for insights into the future
Clan. D’Arcy encompasses all the Fenian activities during its existence, and his
monograph illuminates the scope of the group’s actions in the second half of the 19th

David Sim, A Union Forever: The Irish Question and U.S. Foreign Relations in The
Victorian Age, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013)
13 William D’Arcy, The Fenian Movement in The U.S., 1858-1886, (Washington D.C.:
Catholic University Of America Press, 1947)
12
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century. D’Arcy’s monograph answers the question of “who” the Clan members were, at
least in its first years.
Charles C. Tansill’s monograph America and the Fight For Irish Freedom
1866-1922: An Old Story Based Upon New Data directly responds to my research
question because it examines the Clan’s effectiveness in my research period. 14
Ultimately, Tansill argues the Clan na Gael was not more successful because of specific
objectives or strategic policies; rather, world events (particularly World War I) played
into the dismantling of the British Empire. Irish nationalist groups’ constant resistance to
a constitutional solution (i.e. Home Rule) made any alternative to total autonomy a nonstarter. Tansill argues that from the British side of affairs, a combination of poor policy
decisions all served to ally world opinion against the British. Tansill continues his
analysis on the American side, contending that as Wilson’s Anglophilia became more
apparent, Irish Americans became more vocally nationalist. The cause of Irish
independence developed global sympathy. The Irish American nationalists in the Clan na
Gael used the British preoccupation with World War I for their own purposes, and
actively championed United States’ neutrality. Britain’s failure to act quickly during the
first readings of the Home Rule bill, combined with allowing the Ulster Unionists
unlimited posturing and rhetoric, created a perfect opportunity for the Irish nationalist
groups to reassert themselves.
Francis M. Carroll’s American Opinion on the Irish Question, 1910-1923: A
Study in Opinion and Policy is useful for its measured assessment of the state actors and

14

Tansill, America and the Fight For Irish Freedom, 1866-1922
11

Clan na Gael members involved in the debate over the “Irish Question.” This study
argues that a constitutional solution to Irish independence had broad public support for
the first years of the 1910s.15 However, the build-up to World War I, the war and its
aftermath, created a more militant Irish American public. These Irish Americans were no
longer content with a gradual constitutional approach, and now supported a more radical
answer to the “Irish question.” Carroll traces the apex of the Home Rule movement and
John Redmond’s role as a constitutionalist to its dramatic drop off after the Rising. The
monograph’s focus on “American opinion” means that the British side of affairs is not so
deeply examined. Nonetheless, Carroll concludes that Home Rule would have been
implemented as a semi-satisfactory conclusion if World War I not changed the situation’s
dynamic. Carroll’s tight focus on 13 years of the “Irish question” is indispensable for any
project on 20th century Irish American nationalism.
Joseph P. Finnan’s John Redmond and Irish Unity, 1912-1918 was invaluable in
creating a multi-dimensional understanding of the Clan’s opposition stance.16 This
monograph was crucial in understanding the Clan na Gael’s opposition and activism
against Home Rule.
Finnan’s research period makes for an extremely tight study of Irish politics in
that time frame. The parliamentary Irish Party, led by John Redmond, sought a) the
passage of a Home Rule Bill and b) its implementation. The Clan did not support this
position, arguing for Ireland’s complete independence. The author traces the challenges

15

Francis M. Carroll, American Opinion on the Irish Question, 1910-1923: A Study in
Opinion and Policy, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1978)
16
Joseph P. Finnan, John Redmond and Irish Unity, 1912-1918, (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 2004)
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of Irish Party hegemony over the Irish nationalists, Redmond’s course in navigating
Parliament, Prime Ministers Asquith and Lloyd George, and his own constituents. The
outbreak of World War One condemned the Irish Party to maneuvering within a domestic
political scene intrinsically focused on patriotic duty and winning a war, not on separatist
questions of dominion status during an all-out war effort. Where the Irish Party once
commanded widespread, majority public support, by 1916 ( the end of this research
project’s time frame), the same was decisively untrue. The Clan used this to their
advantage, and worked assiduously to undermine the Home Rulers and Redmond.
Other scholars have also shed light on pieces of the Clan na Gael puzzle. Patricia
Jalland and John Stubb’s journal article, “The Irish Question After the Outbreak of War
in 1914: Some Unfinished Party Business,” thoroughly explains the legislative
components of the Home Rule Bill of 1912, and how the Liberal Party responded to the
outbreak of World War I.17 It provides a clear picture of the two months after the
outbreak of World War One from the British perspective. Although these seemed to be
domestic British affairs, and thus outside the purview of this thesis, nonetheless this
journal article makes clear the heavy weight of Irish American opinion in regards to
public policy formation in Britain.
In the United States, the Clan na Gael was starting to carry significant social and
cultural weight. M. Alison Kibler’s study of “the Practical Censorships of McFadden’s
Row of Flats…” traces the Clan na Gael-organized protests based on the play’s

Patricia Jalland and John Stubbs, “The Irish Question After the Outbreak of War in
1914: Some Unfinished Party Business,” The English Historical Review, Volume 96,
Number 381 (October 1981) pp. 778-807
17
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characterization of the Irish as lowly beasts/drunk slatterns. Ultimately, the Irish
American community forced the producers of the play to edit out particularly offensive
characteristics and props, leading the Irish Americans to boast they “had practically
censored” McFadden’s Row of Flats out of existence.18 The maturity and organization of
these protests is significant because it means that the Clan na Gael was an effective
social force by this time.
The budding acceptance of the American Catholic hierarchy (overwhelmingly
Irish) towards Irish nationalist hopes highlighted the increasing cooperation of the Clan
na Gael with the Church. No longer outright antagonists, the clergy was becoming more
vocal about their support of the Irish independence. The détente between Catholic Church
and Irish American nationalists was enormously helpful to mainstream Catholics support
of Irish independence efforts because prior Irish nationalist groups were castigated and
expelled by the Church. Charles T. Strauss’ journal article “God Save the Boer: Irish
American Catholics and the South African War, 1899-1902,” reflects a more recent trend
in studies of Irish American nationalism: how specific conflicts aided or failed Irish
American nationalist hopes.19 This emphasis is necessary because it points to the growing
political exertions of Irish Americans, particularly the Clan na Gael, on behalf of Ireland

18

M. Alison Kibler, “Pigs, Green Whiskers, and Drunken Widows: Irish Nationalists and
the ‘Practical Censorships’ of ‘McFadden’s Row of Flats’ in 1902 and 1903,” Journal of
American Studies, Volume 42, Number 3 Film and Popular Culture (December 2008), pp.
489-514
19 Charles T. Strauss, “God Save the Boer: Irish American Catholics and the South
African War, 1899-1902,” U.S. Catholic Historian, Volume 26, Number 4 Politics (Fall
2008), pp. 1-28
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in America. Where this journal succeeds is in illuminating the wealth of anti-Anglo
sentiment and how the Clan na Gael capitalized on the ready parallel between their own
“British subjugation” and the plight of the Boers in South Africa. Taken as a whole, the
maturation of the Clan na Gael was reflected in the more extensive social and cultural
roles they assumed. By 1912, the Clan was poised to marshal and to mobilize their social,
cultural and political capital in a final push for Irish independence.
Thomas J. Rowland’s “Irish-American Catholics and the Quest For Respectability
in the Coming of the Great War, 1900-1917” provided a more current example of
assimilationist theory. Rowland joins notable Irish historian Thomas Brown in his
assessment of an Irish Catholic immigrant driven by “a quest for respectability.”20 This
article was most helpful for its analysis of Catholicism not as an impediment, but as a
means to supercharge one’s patriotism. This argument can also be used to examine Irish
American attitudes towards neutrality, formed by Irish American weeklies such as the
Gaelic American, in the years directly preceding American entrance into World War One.
Recent scholarship trends have emphasized the religious aspect of Irish-American
nationalism, or the Irish American labor history, or explored micro-communities via
statistical data.21 These studies have all contributed to a deeper understanding of the Irish
American experience at turn of the twentieth century. However, a gap in the scholarship

20

Thomas J. Rowland, “Irish-American Catholics and the Quest for Respectability in the
Coming of the Great War, 1900-1917,” Journal of Ethnic History, Volume 15, Number 2
(Winter 1996) p. 3-31
21
See David M. Emmons, The Butte Irish: Class and Ethnicity in an American Mining
Town, 1875-1925, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990). Also Michael L. Mullan,
Opposition, Discipline and Culture: The Civic World of the Irish and Italians in
Philadelphia, 1880-1920, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2009). Also Timothy J.
Meagher, Inventing Irish America: Generation, Class, and Ethnic Identity in a New
England City, 1880-1928. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001)
15

exists. There is still no extended examination of just the Clan na Gael in the same time
frame. As the primary resistance group of Irish American nationalists in this period, their
influence must be analyzed to further the conversation surrounding opposition voices and
agitation. The current political environment makes such studies even more timely. This
project contributes to the historical dialogue surrounding Irish American nationalism,
activism, and resistance.
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CHAPTER ONE
SHIFTING CURRENTS (1912)

Ireland’s Irish Literary Revival of the earliest twentieth century was spearheaded
by a renaissance in Gaelic culture- and William Butler Yeats and J.M. Synge were
leading lights of this new force in literature, language, theatre, and sport. When the
Abbey Theatre, the newly founded National Theatre of Ireland, toured America in 19111912, they presented J.M. Synge’s The Playboy of the Western World to American
audiences for the first time. Synge’s play was set in a pub in County Mayo in modern
Ireland, and featured patricide, a love affair, pub brawls, and Synge’s faithful capture of
Irish dialect and language. But Irish Americans were not as taken with Synge’s portrayal
of the Irish, and bristled at the stereotypical “stage Irishman” they saw on stage. Rowdy
demonstrations accompanied the play wherever it was presented, and police were
summoned to provide security for the play’s performances. When the play arrived in
Philadelphia, the head of the Clan na Gael’s District Two, Joseph McGarrity, fired the
opening salvo. Rising from his theatre seat, McGarrity shouted “I protest against this play
which is a libel on Irish character and a gross misrepresentation of Irish peasant life!” In
New York City, the Clan’s protest was commanded by none other than John Devoy, exFenian and now-Clan na Gael leader. Despite the strong police presence, Devoy
challenged the theatre and all in it. At the closing of the first act, Devoy erupted from his
seat and roared, “Son of a bitch, that’s not Irish!” At this cue, rotten vegetables strafed
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the stage, hurled by complicit Clan audience members. Joseph McGarrity summed up the
Clan’s position towards the play, insisting, “There was nothing in the play that would
cause anyone who would witness it to have love or admiration for the people or the
country represented in it. If the Playboy is art to hell with art and those who create it.” 22
The first decade of the twentieth century revealed a nearly defunct Clan na Gael.
Fractured deeply in the late 1880s and 1890s by internecine fighting, and charges of
treachery and corruption, the Clan had recently stitched itself back together through the
indefatigable efforts of John Devoy, Daniel Cohalan, Joseph McGarrity, and others.
Created to aid and abet revolutionary efforts in Ireland, specifically the Irish Republican
Brotherhood (IRB), the Clan did not content itself with merely funneling money to the
IRB, but chose to pursue an activist path to influence any issue affecting Irish Americans.
Whether cultural, social, economic or political- the Clan na Gael had an opinion. These
opinions were most visible in Devoy’s New York City weekly, the Gaelic American.
Founded in 1903, and edited by Devoy, the weekly was immediately the preferred
trumpet of the Clan. Devoy biographer Terry Golway illuminated the crucial difference
between the Gaelic American and other ethnic newspapers, noting that the Gaelic
American was not a model promoting assimilation, focused on “erudite analyses of
European politics and dispatches from various lands struggling under Britain’s yoke…
written and edited for educated and highly literate leaders of Irish America.”23 Devoy and
the Clan utilized the Gaelic American to influence the upper strata of Irish American
society, compatriots who could better operate the levers of power on behalf of Irish
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independence. As the Clan grew slowly but steadily, its efforts became assured enough to
attempt to influence political elites like Congressman William Bourke Cockran, and the
presidential election of 1912. While it seemed patently clear that a successful Home Rule
bill would kill the organization, the Clan fought tooth and nail to defeat it, and had some
unlikely allies. In this chapter, I argue 1912 proved to be a critical pivot point for the
Clan and for the Irish independence movement. Devoy and the Clan’s relentless efforts
led the Irish American republican resistance by threading together cultural recognition,
political activism, and public relations in one massive mobilization effort. In 1912, the
tide of moderate Irish-American opinion was incrementally and gradually shifting to a
republican vision for Ireland. In four short years, the tide would be running swiftly for an
independent Ireland.
The presidential election of 1912 preoccupied the Clan’s domestic political
activism, and the Clan sought to take advantage of the candidates’ increasing awareness
of Irish American voting power. Irish Americans historically voted Democratic, but the
presidential candidates all made efforts to woo the bloc’s votes. Incumbent Republican
President William Howard Taft attended a 1910 Chicago St. Patrick’s Day celebration
held by the Irish Fellowship Club. It was the first time a sitting president attended a St.
Patrick’s Day observance. Two years later, ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, now
running as the Bull Moose Party’s candidate, attended a lunch held in London’s
Westminster Palace by Irish Party leader John Redmond and other Irish Members of
Parliament. John Redmond and the Irish Party believed in a constitutional, parliamentary
solution to the Irish Question, but did not advocate Roosevelt’s presence signaled a
victory for Irish respectability, and “for the first time since the 1880s, Irish Americans
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merited the attention of national figures.”24 The Roosevelt/Redmond lunch was
orchestrated by Irish American nationalist Patrick Egan, a key figure in the United Irish
League of America (UIL), Redmond’s American outreach organization. The Democratic
Party candidate, Woodrow Wilson, once championed a British federation that would
permit the national aspirations of the Irish, Welsh, and Scots. However, the national
spotlight forced Wilson into a blander position; while campaigning for president, Wilson
made no official statement regarding Ireland’s position within the British Empire.25 In
1910-1911, the majority of all Americans viewed the Irish question through a pro-Anglo
lens, believing that if the Irish question was successfully and peacefully resolved, it
would lead to a better diplomatic partnership with Great Britain.26 Irish American opinion
was more nuanced. However, a Home Rule Bill would also serve to defuse the agitations
of the Irish American political bloc by “robbing them of their greatest issue.”27 The Clan
na Gael mobilized public opinion to agitate for Irish independence, a more radical
political step than Home Rule. The presidential election of 1912 allowed the Clan na
Gael to first, put the Irish Question into the broader political discourse, and second, exert
pressure on presidential candidates who best supported the republican Irish position. The
Clan’s efforts in the 1912 presidential election marked their first assured attempts at
political influence on a national level.
Woodrow Wilson’s election in 1912 alarmed the Clan na Gael leadership.
Wilson’s “internationalism” troubled Devoy and his deputy, Judge Daniel Cohalan, for it
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spoke of greater cooperation with Great Britain at the expense of the nationalist
aspirations of Ireland.28 Wilson’s private secretary, Joseph Tumulty, himself an IrishAmerican, “recorded in his memoirs that Wilson was honestly concerned with Irish selfgovernment.” 29 Wilson biographer John Milton Cooper, Jr. endorses this belief, arguing
that Wilson was in fact less Anglocentric than is generally believed, despite his “Scottish
heritage, English-born mother, Anglophilic literary tastes and long-standing admiration
for British political institutions.”30 Wilson’s concerns were mainly domestic, however,
and he focused on overhauling the Federal Reserve, tariff reform and anti-trust
legislation. With the exception of the Mexican intervention in 1912, Wilson was not
particularly invested in foreign policy until the outbreak of World War One.
Although scholarship leans to the consensus school of Wilson as irredeemable
racist, there was an undeniable undertow of nativism pulsing throughout all of America in
the first decades of the twentieth century. In that sense, President Wilson was not alone in
his belief in Anglo-Saxon primacy. Assimilation, for Wilson and others, meant
subsuming whatever ethnic qualities and loyalties one retained into the greater good of
being “American.” President-elect Wilson campaigned on “a national policy of exclusion.
The whole question is one of assimilation of diverse races. We cannot make a
homogenous population of people who do not blend with the Caucasian race.” 31 While
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the greatest loathing seemed aimed at non-whites, Irish-Americans and GermanAmericans were also victims. Nativists decried the ethnic clusters in cities, and also
pointed at the influence of the Roman Catholic Church with many of these newer
immigrants. It wasn’t just point of origin that concerned nativists, for in their estimation a
true American was of necessity Protestant. What historian Alexander DeConde termed
“hyphenate hysteria” was a reiteration of the nativists’ old complaint that immigrants
kept themselves aloof, making it more difficult to assimilate. The “hyphenate” referred to
groups like the Irish and Germans in particular, who self-identified as “Irish-American”
or “German-American,” implying that they were unwilling to loosen the ties that bound
them to their mother country. And if that were the case, how could these groups ever
hope to be considered “Americans?” Perhaps more importantly, the nativists could claim
that these groups self-isolated, and thus were responsible for the charges of “divided
loyalties.” This theme continued and grew more prevalent as the clouds of war gathered
in Europe.
The Clan na Gael, hardly fans of Wilson’s to begin with, chose to pursue an
activist agenda that emphasized their Irishness, rather than diminished it. For Devoy and
the Clan, this took the practical path of pursuing alliances with other maligned ethnic
groups, particularly the Germans. As the two largest immigrant groups in America, it was
a sensible and pragmatic matter to combine their powers as voting blocs into one superalliance. Speaking at a joint rally held by German-Americans and Irish-Americans at
New York’s Cooper Union in 1911, Devoy claimed “We love America more than we
hate England, and it is our love for America which governs our actions…”32 Post
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Victorian Age, America and Britain’s diplomatic relations grew steadily closer, rejecting
the efforts of Irish American nationalists to exploit any conflicts they could for Irish gain.
Devoy argued that greater diplomatic cooperation with Britain was inimical to American
interests, not just Irish: one of his shrewdest political moves. This served multi-purposes:
Devoy could successfully rebut the charges of nativists about “divided loyalties,” he
could remind Americans of the forefathers’ warnings against “foreign entanglements,”
and he could remind Americans that any European wars should stay in Europe. Had
Devoy inserted and promoted Ireland’s cause as a primary goal- he would have
undoubtedly opened himself up to exactly the same charges that dogged other immigrant
groups. For Devoy to hide behind the red, white, and blue of the American flag versus the
golden harp of Ireland was not only ironic, but also cunning.
The Clan na Gael methodically and carefully maintained public visibility for the
Irish nationalist cause through their sustained use of the media and public relations
campaigns. However, the Clan’s assured political posture in 1912 belied their actual
strength. Although the group was steadily gaining grounds in membership and influence,
it remained a secret organization with oath-bound members. The men of the Clan (no
females were permitted) were often also members of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, the
Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, and other “open” Irish American fraternal organizations.
“Infiltrating” these public organizations, the Clan members facilitated and executed their
own resistance strategies on behalf of Irish independence. Similarly, the Irish Republican
Brotherhood members “infiltrated” the Irish separatist political party Sinn Féin, giving
the party a decidedly more republican cast than Arthur Griffith, the founder, intended.
Dual memberships in “open” and “secret” societies allowed the Clan and the IRB to
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influence public opinion via the press, public rallies, direct lobbying efforts, and
fundraising. Unfortunately for the Clan and the IRB, however, their necessary “secret”
status meant that they never had the funds or operating budget that would have enabled
even greater resistance efforts. Nonetheless, the sheer amount of money flowing across
the Atlantic to finance Irish republicanism reflected the exertions of Devoy and other
Clan members, as well as the surprising amount of coordination with their Irish
revolutionary counterparts. The Clan na Gael attempted to influence the public through
their overt activities in the open fraternal societies, and their covert activities within the
Clan.
Devoy and the Clan maintained the drumbeat of Irish nationalism in America
through an unremitting public relations campaign carried out in every Irish-American
press vehicle. Devoy defended Irish-Americans and the Irish themselves, for he
envisioned a vast Anglo conspiracy aimed at demeaning the Irish at any cost.33 Devoy
considered the British capable of any low, especially where the Irish people were
concerned, yet carefully cast his rhetoric in the words of a patriot, not an Irish agitator.
From the pages of the Gaelic American, Devoy advocated his vision of “an IrishAmerican community still very much at the mercy of an ancient enemy who was
perfectly capable of crossing the Atlantic to subvert the American republic in general and
Irish-Americans in particular to suit the needs of empire.”34 Devoy in particular remained
ruthless at correcting the prevailing Irish stereotypes: the stage Irishman, the drunk
Paddy, the bog farmer. In 1902 and 1903, McFadden’s Row of Flats, a play depicting the
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campaign for alderman waged by two immigrant saloonkeepers, set off violent protests
by Irish nationalists in America. Although the play ran for five years, by 1902 and 1903
the Clan na Gael was sufficiently reorganized and reenergized enough to carry out
methodical protests within the theatre space itself. Bristling at nearly every aspect of
McFadden’s portrayal of the Irish, the Clan encouraged its members to hurl vegetables
and eggs on stage. Historians M. Alison Kibler and Lucy McDiarmid’s assess the newly
resurgent Clan’s motive for protest as a calculated effort to upset “the control of culture
exercised by the dominant class.”35 This analysis is in contrast to the older
historiography’s emphasis on an Irish-American near obsessive quest for assimilation and
respectability.36 This shift in interpretation emphasizes Irish American agency over
accommodation. The response to McFadden’s Row of Flats foreshadowed the furor one
decade later when famed poet William Butler Yeats, a leader in the Irish Literary
Revival, brought a fellow Irishman’s play to America. J.M. Synge, a co-founder of the
Abbey Theatre, wrote The Playboy of the Western World in the evocative Anglo-Irish
heard and spoken in County Mayo where the play was set. Although such adherence to
the colloquial language of Ireland should have pleased Irish nationalists, they instead
took umbrage at the play’s representations of Irish womanhood, the Catholic Church, and
according to Arthur Griffith, it’s insufficient politicism. Irish nationalist response to
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“stage Irish” characterizations diverged along their political lines: while moderate groups
like the United Irish League of America advocated boycotts, the Clan resisted in direct
actions like disorderly conduct at the play performances.37 Competing claims for the
mantle of Irish American leadership might have spurred the Irish American nationalists’
response to The Playboy of the Western World, but what cannot be disputed is the
obvious flowering of nationalism and cultural identity that provoked both groups to act in
defense of Irish identity. In terms of press coverage, the Clan’s rowdier response merited
more ink. Devoy succeeded in pushing the Clan’s public relations agenda forward.
The Gaelic Revival of the first decade of the twentieth century buttressed this
flowering of Irish nationalism. Douglas Hyde’s Gaelic League was founded to promote
all things Gaelic, a bid to “de-Anglicize Ireland.” The primary focus of the Gaelic League
was linguistic. In 1903, the Clan endorsed the efforts of the Gaelic League explicitly,
publishing a circular that stated “The work of the Gaelic League is in line with the objects
of the Clan na Gael. It is preparing the mind of the country for the supreme effort that
will lead to the final triumph of the Gael.”38 The Gaelic League founded a New York
City office to support its efforts in America, and Clan executive Judge Daniel Cohalan
served as its Chairman. The Gaelic League of Ireland sent “missions” led by envoys like
Diarmuid Lynch to America regularly between 1900-1915, and the earlier “intellectual
public meetings of Douglas Hyde” were eventually replaced by the “music and dancing
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[that became] intrinsic parts of the envoys’ public meetings.”39 This change reflected the
Irish American desire to be entertained, as well as dunned. Unfortunately, the Clan na
Gael’s initial cooperation with the Gaelic League was soon soured by the demands of its
members, and what seemed to be an obvious partnership devolved into an acrid,
suspicious truce.
The Clan na Gael had one over-arching goal: Irish independence. The Gaelic
League was a cultural force, not a political one. In Devoy’s mind, the Gaelic League by
necessity needed to remain focused on the cultural revolution, not the political one. When
Shane Leslie, a Gaelic League envoy in America, gave a speech at a fundraising event in
1911, he inadvertently angered Devoy by referring to the necessity of education in Irish
nationalism, a salient point of a Home Rule Bill. Any discussion anywhere of a Home
Rule Bill was anathema to the Clan and the IRB, and moreover, was a gross overreach of
the Gaelic League’s purported goals and messaging. Although Devoy qualified his
criticism of Leslie by noting that Leslie “is a man of much promise,” he hastened to add
that “he may or may not develop.”40 Devoy’s enmity extended to Douglas Hyde. In a
letter to Daniel Cohalan, his deputy in the Clan, Devoy acidly remarked “Hyde is making
nonsensical speeches about the Irish people having got their land and going to get their
nationality. This is politics and the Gaelic League is supposed to be nonpolitical.”41
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Furthermore, Devoy believed that Hyde and John Redmond were allied, although
Redmond “does nothing for him [Hyde] and [his] friends are hostile to the League.” This
was an interesting aside for Devoy, for why should he care about favors extended to the
Gaelic League if they are a cultural organization, as he insists they remain? Any overt
“hostility” to the League, as Devoy suggested, would be counter-productive and counterintuitive to the aims of the Irish Party, first, and Redmond himself, second. Anything
detrimental to Redmond was, by extension, a victory for the Clan na Gael’s republican
organization. Promotion of the Gaelic culture would benefit the Irish Party, but naturally
the IRB and the Clan na Gael, as well. A “Gael” spirit did not necessarily mean a
republican or rebellious one. It certainly didn’t have to equate the two.
Devoy bristled at Yeats’ assumption of a quasi-imprimatur of the Gaelic League,
writing Cohalan “the worst is that Yeats has managed to fill every American editor with
the idea that his theatre company is a product of the Gaelic League, has Hyde’s
endorsement, and that by inference approves the ‘Playboy.’” Devoy believed that Hyde’s
refusal to issue a denial of Yeats’ premise constituted a capitulation, and Devoy was
ever-alert to any possible flaws or defects in others’ commitment to the cause.42
Successful fundraising by the Gaelic League also diverted funds that could have gone to
support the Clan’s clandestine pipeline to the IRB. Devoy complained that “the time of
our men is continually taken up with raising money for the League, to the neglect of our
own work.” He continued with resentment: “hardly anyone else does anything, and yet
everything is done to please those who are hostile or indifferent and every

42

ibid
28

recommendation made by us or our friends is ignored.”43 Moreover, the Irish-American
network that existed through the Clan’s efforts, according to Devoy, was continually
tapped for resources by the Gaelic League. Although the goals of both organizations
would seem to be complementary, Devoy drew a deep line of demarcation between the
two, and took umbrage at the Gaelic League’s demands. For Devoy, complementary aims
were insufficient motivations when the Clan/ IRB was the only true Irish nationalist
group. Devoy felt as if the Clan was being marginalized, for he frostily remarked to
Cohalan that “it is time we insist on being treated seriously. I don’t believe in attacking
the Gaelic League, but I do believe our men ought to mind their own special business
until we are treated with greater respect. It [the Gaelic League] has plenty of room to
collect funds from the rich Irishmen here without keeping our men running errands for
them and being treated as errand boys.” 44 Ultimately, the Gaelic League severed any
connection with Yeats and the Abbey Company, for “the reliance of the Gaelic League
on the Gaelic societies and on men like Devoy, who controlled the powerful Clan na
Gael movement [made it obvious that] the money from America was the priority and
those who threatened to remove that source of income had to be appeased at all costs.”45
Devoy and the Clan succeeded in pressuring the Gaelic League into following their
message, not the inverse.
Although the Clan was highly politicized and vocal, its most lasting contribution
on behalf of Irish independence was financial, not political. The opposition campaign to
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the Root-Bryce Treaty in the Senate provided Devoy and the Clan a high-profile success
in foreign relations activism. An entente between Britain and America, clearly evident by
the turn of the century, alarmed Irish American nationalists, especially John Devoy and
the Clan na Gael.46 In the Senate for ratification in early 1912, Root-Bryce was the
legacy of President Taft’s efforts to create an arbitration agreement with Great Britain
that stemmed from disputes that arose in Canadian/U.S. fisheries. Devoy spearheaded
the Clan’s opposition to the treaty, characterizing it as an attempt by England to draw the
United States into a military alliance to counteract the growing threat posed by imperial
Germany.47 Summoning all his talents as an organizer, Devoy led the Irish- American
resistance to Root-Bryce. When Root- Bryce failed to pass the Senate in March of 1912,
Devoy was exultant, and considered the political triumph “Irish America’s greatest
victory over England.”48 Perhaps Devoy was exhilarated because this was one of the very
few successful attempts by the Clan to intervene in foreign policy. Regardless, Devoy
and the Clan successfully assisted in the resistance of foreign policy detrimental to the
Irish republican strategy. The lobbying effort against Root/Bryce involved a concerted
push directed at elite politicians- indicating the assurance with which the Irish American
activists operated. Focusing on U.S. Senators directly, without the protective umbrella of
party machinery like Tammany Hall in New York City, emphasized the top-down quality
of the Clan’s activism. The opposition to Home Rule was an even more involved effort.
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The Clan na Gael bitterly rejected the idea of Home Rule, for it provided a
“palliative and not a cure for the political ills of Ireland.”49 Home Rule was introduced in
1912 by British Prime Minister Asquith. The Liberal Party majority was forced to present
the Home Rule Bill because they owed their razor-thin edge to the Irish Party. The Clan,
led by John Devoy and Daniel Cohalan, shifted into overdrive to counter the moderate,
constitutional Home Rule proposal. John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Party, believed
faithfully in a parliamentary solution to the “Irish Question.” He was supported by the
vast majority of Irish voters, as well as Irish-Americans. Nonetheless, the Clan spurned
Home Rule, insisting as early as 1900 “that members shall abstain from giving support,
directly or indirectly, to the Parliamentary movement and from participation in meetings
held for the purpose aiding that movement.”50 A follow up circular in 1901 reminded
Clan members that “no member of our organization shall become a member of the United
Irish League, or in any way aid or support it, or any other constitutional movement, and
shall, as far as practicable, in every way oppose such movements.” Clearly, Redmond’s
American outreach organization, the United Irish League, had made inroads in the Clan
na Gael membership rolls, and thus the necessary stern rebuke to Clan members. The
Clan remained vigilant in maintaining their militarist and separatist policy, and Devoy’s
Gaelic American “portray[ed] Redmond as prepared to sell out the dream of the republic
for the unacceptable compromise of Home Rule” with some success.51 By 1912,
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Redmond could no longer depend on the open pockets of Irish Americans to help fund
his party and its support of Home Rule. The currents of Irish nationalism were shifting.
The activities of the Clan na Gael in 1912 marked a departure and a critical pivot
point for the Irish nationalist cause. The Clan mounted a furious political offensive
against the Root-Bryce Treaty, and succeeded in its resistance for Senate ratification. In
the pages of the Gaelic American, John Devoy maintained the excellence and superiority
of the Irish race. The Clan also executed a highly visible and successful campaign against
“stage Irish” characterizations that dealt in stereotypes that were highly offensive, but no
more so than those leveled at Germans or any other immigrant group. The Gaelic League
stimulated the pride of Irish Americans and capitalized on it through fundraising tours in
both decades of the 1900-1910s. And whether it was a case of the chicken or the egg, all
these winds of change collided to create a new, more militant republican spirit. Although
it would not be apparent for a few more years, in 1912 several crosscurrents in Irish
America propelled the cause of Irish independence forward. With some highly unlikely
allies, Ireland and Irish America moved into 1913 poised for even greater exertions, but
ultimately greater rewards.
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CHAPTER TWO
SWIFT WINDS AND A FOLLOWING SEA (1913-1914)

Immigration to America experienced one of its periodic surges in the first two
decades of the twentieth century. But the new immigrants were predominantly from
Eastern and Southern Europe. Nativists, stung by the “threat” posed by these new
immigrants, sounded their old battle cry. However, the new nativist rhetoric was
modernized, and took aim at “hyphenated Americans.” The term was an epithet, not a
description- and it aimed at Americans who were of foreign birth or origin, and displayed
an allegiance to a foreign country. On one of his periodic lobbying efforts to legislators,
John Devoy, still a leader of the Clan na Gael in his seventies, met with Senator John
Sharp Williams of Mississippi. When the Senator complained about “hyphenated
Americans” to Devoy, Devoy had little use for it. Devoy pointedly asked the Senator
“Aren’t the Anglo-Saxons hyphenated?” The Senator assented the point, but rebutted:
“Yes, but I’m not Anglo-Saxon. I’m a Welshman. But my people have been here for a
hundred and fifty years.” Devoy locked him with cold eyes and said “Judging by that
standard, Sitting Bull has a better record.”52
The Clan na Gael maintained a diverse strategy of public relations efforts, foreign
relations activism, and continued and better coordination with the Irish Republican
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Brotherhood. As 1913 moved into 1914, geopolitics and European alliances drew
Britain’s attention away from the Irish question, and onto the battlefield. Home Rule
received the royal assent in 1914, but never implemented, as the guns of World War One
opened up. With Britain’s attention diverted to the war effort, Devoy and the Clan chose
to ally themselves with German Americans and Germany to better improve the position
of the Irish republican nationalists, at the expense of Redmond and his Irish Party and
Home Rule, generally. In a twist of fate, the Clan’s efforts at obstructing Home Rule
were aided by the militant response of the Ulster Unionists, led by Sir Edward Carson.
The Catholic Church hierarchy in America posed Catholics as super-patriots, and the
Irish in America joined groups such as the Knights of Columbus to rebut the nativist
claim of “divided loyalties.” John Devoy and the Clan fought for Irish American
inclusion, not assimilation. They did not believe that subsuming one’s ethnicity was
necessary for being American. This policy allowed Irish Americans greater confidence in
their political involvement as Americans, not hyphenates. This poise was evident as they
resisted Home Rule in Ireland, and agitated for continued neutrality in America.
The Great War posed difficult questions for Americans during the period of
American neutrality from 1914-1917. Loyalty to one’s mother country meant the risk of
being branded disloyal or unpatriotic was quite real. Even remaining attached to one’s
ethnicity via identification as an “Irish-American,” or “German-American,” became
problematic as the push for assimilation at all costs picked up speed. For the Anglophilic
elite, “the persistence of ethnic diversity [was] incompatible with national unity.”
President Woodrow Wilson embodied this principle, and used the presidential pulpit in
191 to reprimand German- and Irish-Americans, saying they “cannot become thorough
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Americans if [they] think of [themselves] in groups…America does not consist of
groups.”53 In response, John Devoy and the Clan reaffirmed their ethnic allegiance and
underscored their anti-British position by promoting the German cause at every
opportunity, particularly in the pages of the Gaelic American. Devoy made this very
public effort “in order to neutralize the undisguised pro-British sentiments of the
American ruling class, that bastion of Protestant, Anglo American power…[for] if the
combined political clout of the nation’s two largest immigrant groups, the Germans and
the Irish, could be massed together, pro- British politicians might think twice before
committing U.S. troops to the Western Front.”54 Devoy was realist enough to know that
completely avoiding American activity in the Great War was nearly impossible, but he
did hope to agitate enough to make Wilson’s administration consider the ramifications of
infuriating the two largest, and best organized voting blocs.
Irish Catholics in America were steadily growing more confident of their place in
the American spectrum. Aided by immigration patterns that stretched back to the
founding of the Republic, the Irish in America were the second largest immigrant group
behind the Germans. In short, the Irish had firm roots. In the second decade of the
twentieth century- Southern and Eastern Europeans were the majority of new immigrants.
Wave after wave of Italians, Poles, and Russians arrived in America through 1900-1920.
These groups did not have the advantage of being from English-speaking countries, as the
Irish did. Clustering in the same ethnic neighborhoods that the Irish had only recently
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vacated as their circumstances had improved, these new immigrants retained much of
their culture, but most particularly, their religion. They were most often Catholic.
In another case of unlikely confederates, the Clan na Gael’s John Devoy and the
Catholic hierarchy forged a tenuous partnership to challenge bigotry in America. The
American Catholic hierarchy was overwhelmingly dominated by the Irish, mocked as the
“hibernocracy.” Archbishop John Ireland (St. Paul) and James Cardinal Gibbons
(Baltimore) led the defense of American Catholicism in the face of rising nativist
resentment. The Clan na Gael was in no way affiliated with the Catholic Church, in fact,
the Clan’s republicanism was anathema to the old guard both in Ireland and in America.
Moreover, the extremism of the Fenian Brotherhood (the Clan’s precursor) had soured
moderate Irish and Irish American opinion towards republicanism. Historian Thomas
Rowland argues “a concern for respectability” motivated the American Catholic
hierarchy to “suppress the more blatantly radical strains of Irish nationalism.”55 This
conservatism was not only apparent in nationalist causes, but also labor relations, as well.
Further, the new breed of nationalists in Ireland and in America were certain that the
Catholic Church was responsible for keeping the Irish poor and ignorant, uncultured and
uncouth.56 Nonetheless, Devoy and the Clan had to accept an uneasy truce with the
“hibernocracy,” because the Clan would be dead in the water should there be an official
disavowal on either side.
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The Clan and the Church worked in rare tandem to promote Irish Americans as
patriots before World War I, and during it. This self-promotion enabled the Irish
Americans to become comfortable in political involvement, and become confident
enough to press for inclusion, not merely assimilation. This was a more radical step than
merely being on the defensive against nativist claims, for it implies a level of challenge
and agency to the nativists’ allegations. For the Clan, there was no need to subsume one’s
ethnicity on the altar of patriotism. For Cardinal Gibbons and Archbishop Ireland, the
image American Catholics needed to project was one of industriousness, temperance, and
patriotism. In that manner, American Catholics could contest the nativist claims of
indolence, intemperance, and Papal allegiance over citizenship.57 However, it must be
noted that no one could ever fully satisfy John Devoy- he had his own extreme standards.
Devoy and the Clan had to maintain cordial relations with the Catholic Church, and press
for greater inclusion of Irish Americans in the political and social spheres. The uneasy
truce between the Clan and the American Catholic hierarchy did not extend to the Clan’s
activities towards John Redmond and Home Rule.
For the Clan na Gael, the Home Rule Bill of 1912 was totally unsatisfactory, as it
still kept Ireland firmly tied to Britain. Anything short of independence was untenable.
The Clan by necessity had to resist Home Rule, and by extension, John Redmond and the
Irish Party. Redmond’s claim to speak for all of the Irish nationalists was invalid. His
faith and optimism in a Parliamentary solution to the “Irish question” reflected his
commitment to Ireland’s place within the Empire- and this alone disqualified him in the
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eyes of the Clan na Gael.58 Redmond’s orthodoxy and one-dimensional analysis of the
resistance to Home Rule meant that he severely underestimated the hostility of the
opposition.
The rise of the Ulster Unionist Party, led by Sir Edward Carson, was the most
direct threat to implementation of the Bill. The participation of over 250,000 Unionists at
a massive rally in Belfast 1912 should have indicated the sincerity and depth of the
opposition to Home Rule, but Redmond and the Irish Party took a “dismissive
approach… referring to it as the ‘Ulster bogey.”59 It would be a fatal flaw in Irish Party
tactics. Redmond was also hamstrung because his support came grudgingly from a
number of groups who saw no other plausible options, while Carson and the Ulster
Unionists were united in common cause, and in a deeply entrenched defensive position.
The creation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a military organization that drilled and
collected weapons openly in defiance of British law, would prove catastrophic for the
Irish Party’s insistence on fair play and constitutional implementation of Home Rule. The
UVF was ostensibly formed to “protect” the Union, when it actually was a paramilitary
force that promised to shed blood if Ireland was ever separated from Britain via Home
Rule. Redmond’s approach seemed overly cautious and conservative in comparison his
opponents’ willingness to go outside traditional means of opposition.
The Irish Volunteer Force, the Irish nationalist force formed in response to the
UVF, was intended to be a nationalist, not republican organization.60 In the Gaelic
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American, Devoy posed the Irish Volunteers a “national army of defense,” and called for
Irish Americans to financially support the Volunteers.61 The Gaelic American placed
fundraising articles for the Irish Volunteers on the front page of over half their weekly
issues in 1914.62 For Devoy and the Clan na Gael, supporting the purchase of arms for
the Volunteers was a far cry from the terror tactics of the early Clan’s Dynamite
Campaign. The Dynamite Campaign of the 1880s split the Clan into two- with Devoy
and his faction vehemently opposed to the civilian bloodshed associated with it.
However, Devoy most assuredly supported a military insurrection against Britain. Devoy
urged his readership to support the IVF, in front page article after front page article. The
Irish Volunteers pointedly condemned the “‘emasculated representative politics of Home
Rule,’ with its delays and compromises.” 63 Had Redmond protested the formation of the
Irish Volunteers (as against good order or peaceful due process) with any vehemence, he
would have been branded a coward at best, a traitor at worst. Neither boded well for his
leadership. Redmond’s only recourse in this circumstance was to simply assume
leadership of the Irish Volunteers, and hope to control it through his own political party
apparatus. His heavy-handed assertion that “the Volunteer executive committee was not
fully representative, and should be enlarged to allow it {for which read-force it}to
represent the party.”64 Redmond forced the executive committee to accept 25 of his
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handpicked men, a concession that further bruised the already tender partnership between
Nationalist military and political groups. Two paramilitary forces now existed in Ireland.
The official British policy of non-interference seemed particularly ineffectual
given the highly publicized success of the UVF’s importation of over 50,000 rifles in
April 1914. The Gaelic American noted the illegality of the UVF’s operation, and argued
on its front page “Gun Running Connived At- British government allowed the Carsonites
to land their arms and take them safely inland.”65 When Irish Volunteers attempted their
own gun-running operation, albeit on a much smaller scale, at Howth, Ireland in July of
the same year, they were intercepted by British Metropolitan Police. When the
Metropolitan Police attempted to return to Dublin, they were followed by an angry group
of civilians, who hurled insults, stones, and bottles indiscriminately. The police formed
ranks, and in the confusion, the men misinterpreted an order to fire into the crowd to
disperse them. Four civilians died. The “Bachelor’s Walk Massacre” was immediately a
public relations nightmare for the British, for it directly contradicted the government’s
official passivity to the same operation by the UVF.66 Such obvious bias indicated
outright preferential treatment, and the nationalists listed increasingly towards a more
militarized response, as opposed to the constitutional methods espoused by the Irish
Party. The outlines of a potential civil war in Ireland seemed increasingly distinct.
In 1914, the Great War began in Europe, and the three years of American
neutrality proved to be critical ones for Irish American nationalists. The Clan na Gael
balanced on the tightrope of public opinion while remaining patriotic Americans. Now in
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his seventies, John Devoy remained as vocal and attentive as ever. The Great War drove
him to new exertions as Woodrow Wilson’s administration slid into a pro-Allied posture.
In the pages of the Gaelic American, Devoy trumpeted the absolute necessity of
neutrality to his predominantly northeastern readership. On February 2nd, Devoy
rhetorically asked “Is England to Run the United States?” on the front page of the Gaelic
American, hoping to fan the flames of American independence, not acquiescence to
British foreign policy programming.67 The collaboration of Irish and German Americans,
rooted in their common enmity towards Britain, became deeper still. The same
collaboration also existed in Europe, where Irish nationalists were involved in delicate
negotiations with German envoys, both seeking to wound Britain. In America, John
Devoy and a delegation of Clan members including Joseph McGarrity formally met with
the German consul general in New York. The Clan group “formally proposed to align the
Irish-American movement with Germany on behalf of the Irish Republican Brotherhood
in Dublin.”68
Any blow to Redmond was a boon to the Clan, and the members of the Executive
Council of the Clan renewed their efforts at resisting Redmond’s policies, and reasserted
their pro-German program. The beginning of WWI had temporarily shelved the Home
Rule bill, but the Clan remained opposed to a constitutional solution to the Irish question
that did not mean Ireland’s independence. Redmond saw Britain’s entry in the war as a
bright opportunity to demonstrate Ireland’s fealty to the Empire, which would allay
Unionist fears of Home Rule and thus ensure its peaceful implementation. Redmond
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encouraged the Irish Volunteers to enlist in the British army, a political move that
inflamed Irish nationalists. The Irish Volunteers were a domestic defense force created in
response to Ulster’s arming, not a national guard to be mustered in Britain’s war effort.
For Redmond to urge the Irish Volunteers to sacrifice themselves for Britain rather than
Ireland seemed the height of accommodation, not to mention tone-deaf. Nonetheless,
Redmond promised the Volunteers to the Allied manpower effort. This provoked a split
between a faction led by Eoin MacNeill and Padraig Pearse (numbering about 12,000
members) and those loyal to Redmond. The Clan, anti-Redmond to begin with,
vigorously rebutted the suggestion that he and he alone spoke for Irish nationalists. The
Clan took particular issue with using the Volunteers in a European war, and contended
“Ireland had no quarrel with Germany…and the young manhood of Ireland should stay at
home and out of His Majesty’s bloodied uniforms.”69 Patrick Ford’s Irish World, once a
bastion of support for Redmond, became increasingly hostile towards him. The Irish
World provided the most widely circulated media for the Home Rule position, and had
unwaveringly supported Redmond prior to World War I. However, even the Irish World
exhibited the shift in public opinion towards Redmond’s war-time policies. “Ireland, the
paper felt, had no obligation to fight for England and Redmond had no power from the
Irish people to act as a British recruiting agent.”70 Going further still, the paper “refused
to accept the notion that the war, which it saw as one of continental rivalries, in any way
effected Ireland’s vital interests.” 71 The majority Irish American support for Redmond
started waning. In another ominous sign, President Michael Ryan of the United Irish
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League in America wrote to Redmond telling him that he felt the UIL was no longer
necessary, as Home Rule had received royal assent in September of 1914. The UIL and
the Irish World were two Redmondite stalwarts, and their withdrawal of support was
another indication that moderate, mainstream support in Irish America for Redmond was
slipping. The volume of the resistance to Redmond and Home Rule was most assuredly
noticeable, for Dr. John G. Coyle, replacement president after Michael Ryan’s
resignation, reported to Redmond that “the noise and clamor made [by the Irish-German
groups] were quite capable of making the American public think that all the Irish were
pro-German and anti-Redmond.”72 Obviously, the Clan’s marketing campaign was
bearing new fruit.
In 1914, Sir Roger Casement, an Anglo-Irish knight of the British Empire,
became a high-profile, vocal state actor for Irish nationalism. A “trophy convert,”
Casement was famous for his humanitarian work in the Belgian Congo.73 In 1913,
Casement published an anonymous article in Thomas MacDonough’s Irish Review that
received critical praise from Irish nationalists. His Irish nationalism was of the
revolutionary sort, and he was one of the founders of the Irish Volunteers. His
relationship with the Clan na Gael began in July of 1914 as a result of his mission to
raise money to buy arms for the Volunteers. The Irish Volunteers lacked weapons,
particularly in comparison to the well-armed Ulster Volunteer Force. After the split over
Redmond’s coup, the remaining minority Volunteer group led by Pearse and MacNeill
was desperately dependent on American money to purchase guns. The Irish Republican
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Brotherhood and Clan na Gael stepped into the breach and publicized fundraising efforts
for the Volunteers. In October, Casement returned to the United States, this time on a
much more delicate exercise. He proposed to go “to Berlin and act as the Irish
movement’s ambassador and lobbyist, and to raise a brigade made up of Irish prisonersof-war in German camps.”74 The sinews binding the German and Irish and American
conspiracy grew tighter.
In 1913 and 1914 the Clan na Gael faced the awesome task of marshalling
resistance to the third Home Rule Bill read in Parliament. This Home Rule Bill was
massively popular within the moderate Irish American community, as well as the
majority of the Irish populace. The Catholic Church also supported Home Rule as it
aligned with their political conservatism in Ireland. In a strange twist of fate, the Clan na
Gael was joined in opposition by a most unlikely ally: the Ulster Unionists. It was a case
of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Ulster Unionists, led by Sir Edward Carson,
flatly refused the premise of Home Rule, demanding that Ireland remain a part of the
Union. Although there could obviously be no collaboration, both the Clan and the Ulster
Unionists were both wholly engaged in defeating the Home Rule Bill from their
respective positions.
The Clan na Gael also had to combat the anti-Catholic bias still prevalent in the
earliest twentieth century, without revealing their ambivalence, if not outright hostility,
towards the official Catholic Church and its hierarchy. The Clan na Gael championed a
policy of inclusion, not assimilation, to galvanize Irish American resistance to John
Redmond, Home Rule and American participation in World War I. The Clan’s insistence

74

Golway, Irish Rebel, 203
44

on an equal Irish American claim to being “patriotic Americans” undoubtedly created
more animated, involved ethnic activists. In 1915, these new winds of patriotism,
identity, participation, and resistance would all assemble into one great movement.
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CHAPTER THREE
AN INCOMING TIDE (1915)

At 73, John Devoy was struggling to keep up with his own murderous pace. He
was one of the last living Fenians. His prolific correspondence with dozens of people
necessitated switching to a typewriter as he grew older. His eyesight weakened, and his
hearing was nearly gone. In 1915, his Fenian blood brother, Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa,
died a feeble death. Recently reconciled after decades of bitter estrangement, the Rossa
and Devoy reconnection was forged by Rossa’s wife, who reminded Devoy of their
shared past: “I think if you would come and talk of your earlier hopes and labours
together… it would do him a world of good. He has a simple and loving heart, and you
were very dear to it long ago.” The reunion of Devoy and Rossa was mirrored in the
rapprochement in the Irish Volunteers for Rossa’s funeral. Irish past and present was
being forged into one vital movement. Devoy was now the last of the old breed.
In America, the continued exertions of the Clan na Gael in three distinct segments
continued to pressure American opinion on the Irish question. A fiery public relations
campaign fed with constant pro-German publications, demonstrations, and fundraisers
galvanized Irish Americans. The Clan took advantage of the growing Irish republican
fervor that was quickly replacing the moderate, Home Rule nationalists through activism
aimed at opposition to Redmond and his dedication to the Allies, and continued
collaboration with the IRB. John Redmond’s pro-Empire activities put him at direct odds
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with a growing number of Irish, and Irish Americans. For the first three years of World
War I, America’s neutrality was a hot-button issue in a nation of so many immigrants
who hailed from the participating countries. To counteract a pro-Allied bias in the media,
John Devoy and the Gaelic American argued that Germany was actually Ireland’s best
hope for independence. Former Fenian Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa’s funeral in the
summer of 1915 provided the rousing symbolism and rhetoric that emboldened this
revolutionary undertaking, and awakened a complacent Irish American middle class. The
massive demonstration at Madison Square Garden in the same summer showed the depth
of a new mobilization for the Irish independence movement. The events of 1912-1914
provided the current for a militant Irish nationalism. 1915 developed the current into a
tide. The Clan na Gael capitalized on the collision of several outside forces to create the
best possible situation for the Irish republican movement to exploit.
The Clan na Gael sustained its public relations onslaught on the Irish American
public to counteract a pro-Anglo bias in American media in 1915. Primarily utilizing the
Gaelic American and now joined by the Irish World, the Clan promoted a radical proGerman position, not just neutrality. They also blasted the “pecuniary” motivations of the
defense manufacturers who profited from war, and the big banking houses that provided
the loans to float the war effort for the Allies.75 The Gaelic American highlighted the
Kaiser’s Catholic chaplains as exemplars to better contrast the Protestant Allies. The
Clan’s campaign was aided by the publication of many pamphlets and short monographs,
such as Frank Koester’s The Lies of the Allies,76 Sir Roger Casement’s The Crime
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Against Europe: A Possible Outcome of the War of 1914,77 and Edward Steiner’s The
Confession of a Hyphenated American.78 Former Syracuse, New York mayor James K.
McGuire contributed two widely read books: What Could Germany Do For Ireland?79
and The King, The Kaiser, and Irish Freedom80. Headlines from the Gaelic American in
January 1915 trumpet the anti-Allied position, blaring: “Illegal Recruiting Done in the
British Consulate,”81 and “England and Her Allies Are Supplied With Munitions of War
and American Maritime Commerce Severely Affected.”82
Augmenting the media blitz, the Clan focused on impressive demonstrations to
resist pro-Allied sympathies. By early 1915, President Wilson’s approval of vast loans to
fund the Allies drew America ever closer to the Allied side, no matter his official
proclamations of neutrality. Most frequently working in tandem with German groups, a
massive public pro-neutrality rally was held on June 24, 1915 at Madison Square Garden.
A jubilant John Devoy claimed attendance numbers inside and outside the Garden at
100,000, while the New York Police Department put the gate closer to 75,000.83 Either
way, it was a highly effective gathering. The German American/ Irish American coalition
had successfully courted William Jennings Bryan as their featured speaker, a coup for
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their demonstration. Recently resigned as Secretary of State for Woodrow Wilson,
Bryan’s passionate pacifism was no longer in tandem with Wilson’s foreign policy. The
day after his resignation was made public, Bryan remained hopeful of his influence,
saying, “I believe I can do more on the outside to prevent war than I can do on the
inside… I can work to direct public opinion so it will not exert pressure for extreme
action.”84 Bryan quickly followed through on his promise to “direct public opinion,” for
the Madison Square Garden rally was less than one month from his resignation. Bryan
reminded the crowd gathered:
There is no reason why any citizen of this country should desire war,
and I am sure the number of those who actually do desire it is infinitesimally
small.
This class is made up of those who have a pecuniary interest in war and of those
who regard war as a moral stimulant. Outside of the class actually desiring war,
there is a somewhat larger class whose members, while opposing war as a general
proposition
and desiring peace in the abstract, magnify international differences. They believe
that
a nation’s prestige requires it to constantly reiterate its willingness and readiness
to
resort to force.85
Bryan’s remarks revealed his perception of American public opinion. He neatly
drew a line between the majority of Americans who did not desire war, and those who
saw America’s global position as an imperative to intervention. For John Devoy and the
Clan, as well as the German-American interest groups, netting a high-profile, elite
politician like William Jennings Bryan was a public relations victory guaranteed to get
heavy press coverage outside the realm of the ethnic weeklies and media. Five days after
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the Madison Square Garden rally, another public relations opportunity presented itself
with the death of Fenian Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa. O’Donovan Rossa’s funeral
provided all the symbolism and spirituality that fed the new revolutionary spirit.
O’Donovan Rossa spent his final years an incoherent, raving, feeble man. Once
the closest of conspirators, he and Devoy were bitterly estranged over the Clan’s
Dynamite Campaign of the 1880s.86 They had not spoken since, until Rossa’s wife
pleaded with Devoy to visit him as his senility advanced. Devoy relented, and was a
regular visitor at his bedside until his death on June 29, 1915. He was 83. Devoy, ever the
pragmatist, cabled Thomas Clarke in Dublin:

‘“Rossa dead. What shall we do?”

“Send his body home at once,” came the reply.’87

The Clan moved swiftly to capitalize on the publicity surrounding O’Donovan
Rossa’s death: the most significant practical indication of the new martial spirit in Ireland
was the rapprochement of the Irish Volunteers into one body for O’Donovan Rossa’s
funeral. As a former Fenian, Rossa’s funeral was guaranteed a good turnout by the Irish
and Irish American republican groups. His endorsement of the “Dynamite Campaign”
lost him many of his tightest circle in the late 1880s, but in death all was forgiven- even
Rossa’s tepid endorsement of Redmond. Ultimately, Rossa was embraced by all Irish
nationalists, not just republican ones. It was the first time that the Irish Volunteers and the
National Volunteers operated in tandem since their acrimonious split in 1914. They
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bridged their differences to honor a shared hero of Irish nationalism. The grave-side
oration by Padraig Pearse, commander of the Irish Volunteers, became a defining
proclamation of the revolutionaries in Ireland and in America. Rossa’s unrepentant
Fenian past, the thousands who honored his passing, all were fodder for the Clan’s
unrelenting public relations campaign. It was nearly a benediction for the Irish
revolutionary nationalists.
No strangers to symbolism, the Irish Americans held a funeral mass in St. Peter’s
Church on Staten Island before shipping Rossa to his final resting place in Dublin’s
Glasnevin Cemetery. According to the Irish Times report the following day, the Dublin
funeral procession was lengthy, somber, and well-organized. Pearse’s revolutionary
nationalism exalted both O’Donovan Rossa and the Irish nationalist cause. His words
would provide the clarion call for a coming revolution:
I may be taken as speaking on behalf of a new generation that has been rebaptised in the Fenian faith, and that has accepted the responsibility of carrying
out the Fenian programme… We of the Irish Volunteers, and you others who are
associated with us in to-day’s task and duty, are bound together and must stand
together henceforth in brotherly union for the achievement of the freedom of
Ireland… we pledge to Ireland our love, and we pledge to English rule in Ireland
our hate… The Defenders of this Realm have worked well in secret and in the
open. They think that they have pacified Ireland. They think that they have
purchased half of us and intimidated the other half. They think that they have
foreseen everything, think that they have provided against everything; but the
fools, the fools, the fools!– they have left us our Fenian dead; and while Ireland
holds these graves, Ireland unfree shall never be at peace.88
The Clan’s promise to help arm the Irish Volunteers resulted in fundraising
efforts publicized in the Gaelic American. Much of 1914’s Gaelic American front pages
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kept the call for dollars forefront in Irish American consciousness. By 1915, the Gaelic
American made their anti-Redmond rhetoric front-page news just as often as their
fundraising for the Volunteers. The first issue of 1915’s Gaelic American set the tone:
“TRAITORS AND INFORMERS HELP THE ENGLISH,” with the sub-heading
“Redmond Lost To Even A Sense of Shame.”89 While resistance to Home Rule was a
particular focus of the Clan na Gael, Redmond’s efforts on behalf of British recruitment
were also deemed a priority for resistance. Irish blood should not be shed in a European
war. The Gaelic American emphasized the senseless loss of life in a British army for Irish
enlistees, promising readers “Regiments Wiped Out, Reinforced by Drafts From Home
and Then Slaughtered Again…”90 Ireland’s nationalists did not enlist in the British army,
however, a decided disavowal of John Redmond’s earnest recruiting efforts. Redmond
and the Irish Party realized that much of their war policy centered on the enlistment issue.
If Ireland’s nationalists refused to enlist, it would smack of disloyalty to the war effort,
and point to a further divergence from the Empire. These were twin pillars of Redmond’s
optimistic war policy, because patriotic support of the war was supposed to ensure the
good faith necessary for implementation of Home Rule. When the Irish Volunteers split
in 1914, the National Volunteers (Redmond’s vastly larger majority group) suffered from
Redmond’s decision to keep them a political wing of his Irish Party, whereas the Irish
Volunteers were militarily minded, deeply influenced by their IRB infiltration, and more
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radicalized by Redmond’s continued fealty to British war policy. To be sure, it was not
just Irish Volunteers who were disillusioned by Redmond’s war-time strategy.
Redmond’s efforts on behalf of enlistment repelled more and more moderate Irish
Americans, the exact demographic Redmond relied on. For the Irish at home, and the
Irish in America, Redmond’s endeavors on behalf of British recruiting were folly at best,
and treachery at worst. The enlistment crisis also forced Prime Minister Asquith’s hand,
for the manpower demands of World War I forced a reckoning with the “Irish Question.”
The Irish viewed enlistment with scorn, for why serve for a government that refused to
implement any measure of self-rule? World War I was regarded as Britain’s fight, not
Ireland’s- a further step towards a republicanism. Worse yet, if voluntary enlistments
failed to keep pace with the manpower demands of wartime, conscription would be
enacted. Travis Crosby, a Lloyd George biographer, notes that Asquith’s reaction to the
enlistment/ conscription crisis was tortuous, even for Asquith, explaining “he appointed
committee after committee during the conscription debate, perhaps as a delaying tactic to
introduce conscription slowly. Or perhaps it was a device to keep him in the game with
the hope the conscriptionist chorus would slowly die down.” 91 His “wait-and-see”
approach failed miserably again, and he was forced to fashion a partial conscription bill
in January 1916. It passed overwhelmingly, though the Irish Nationalists provided more
than one-half the opposing votes. The Liberals had to accept that winning the war was the
ultimate goal, not Liberal principles.92 Tellingly, recruitment in Ireland stalled all across
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the board by 1916, with Ireland ultimately contributing less than 6% of its male
population- the lowest number in the British Empire.93 The formation of the war-time
coalition British government hastened this process.
The pressures of war, the unrelenting bloodbath on the Western Front, the
disastrous Dardanelles campaign, all combined with a severe munitions shortage forced a
reshuffling of the British government. Asquith’s coalition government, formed in May
1915, was staffed with Home Rule’s staunchest opponents. Asquith remained prime
minister, and the majority of his cabinet were avowed enemies of Home Rule. The
position of attorney-general went to Sir Edward Carson, a nod to his importance within
the Conservative Party. John Redmond was offered a post, but it was a non-political one:
postmaster-general. Redmond rejected the offer, because it was a) bad politics to accept
any British offer while Home Rule was still hanging in the balance, and b) as he
reminded Asquith, “from the Irish point of view [inclusion of Carson in the Cabinet]
would do infinite harm and make our efforts to help [with the war] far more difficult.”94
The new cabinet reflected a resurgent Conservative Party in Britain, but the real issue for
the Irish was the importance of the posts: Carson’s post was by far the more influential.
The incongruity of offering Redmond postmaster-general, and Carson attorney-general
did not bother Asquith. For Irish Americans, the coalition government was yet another
example of British perfidy- for where was the representative nationalist Irish if Sir
Edward Carson, the face of the Ulster Unionists, was Cabinet level? Were both positions
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not equally deserving of representation? Padraig Pearse wrote Joseph McGarrity,
updating him of the situation in Ireland:
You have seen by this that we have what is termed a coalition war ministry
and Redmond will not be in a position to make Asquith toe the line and it is
very likely we might say goodbye to the Home Rule Bill. Conscription will
be the next and the Lord knows what its consequences will be as I am inclined
to think many of the Irish will resist at the very outset.95
The creation of the coalition government served to emphasize the ever-greater
disparity in treatment between the Unionists and the Irish nationalists, and Redmond
increasingly became the target of disdain, even amongst his once-ardent supporters in
Ireland and in Irish America. From their safe haven across the Atlantic, more radical Irish
American voices started to outstrip the moderate, constitutional Home Rulers in Ireland
and in America. The Clan actually had to join the fray in order to direct protests that were
now evident all over the Irish American spectrum, not merely in radical republican Irish
American circles.96
At Woodenbridge, County Wicklow- Redmond spoke to a group of Volunteers and
exhorted them to fight for the Allied cause:
…It would be a disgrace forever to our country, and a reproach to her manhood,
and a denial of the lessons of our history, if young Ireland confined her efforts to
remaining at home to defend the shores of Ireland from an unlikely invasion and
to shrink from the duty of approval on the field of battle.97
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Redmond’s war-time policy of accommodation to the British at the expense of
Home Rule, exemplified by his speech at Woodenbridge, disappointed many Irish
Americans. The “defection” of New York City’s Irish World right after Redmond’s
Woodenbridge speech further marginalized the moderate Irish American nationalist
position to the Irish question. The Irish World was one of Redmond’s staunchest
supporters, and was counted on to be the voice for Redmond’s policy in America. PostWoodenbridge speech, the United Irish League in America (UILA), a Redmond outreach
group, also defected from its pro-Redmond/ Home Rule position. Michael Ryan, the
UILA president, “refused to endorse the Allied cause,” and by 1915 the League’s
treasurer reported to Redmond “there is no money whatever coming in.”98 In the absence
of a highly circulated media vehicle to support its position, the moderate Irish nationalist
position suffered further. Redmond’s Irish Party would have no dedicated voice in Irish
America throughout the whole of 1915. Irish American public opinion was now being
even more heavily influenced by the revolutionary Irish nationalists and the Clan na
Gael.
As the Clan utilized their near monopoly of the Irish American press in 1915, Sir
Roger Casement (the trophy convert to the Irish nationalists) was in Berlin trying to raise
an Irish brigade from captured Irish soldiers in German POW camps. The covert
collaboration between the German government and the Clan na Gael/IRB intensified. As
part of Casement’s efforts for Irish nationalism, he extracted a statement from the
German under-secretary in the Foreign Office outlining the official German attitude
towards Ireland, which stated:
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The Imperial Government formally declares that under no circumstances
would Germany invade Ireland with a view to its conquest or the overthrow
of native institutions in that country. [This] government…is inspired by
goodwill towards a country and a people for whom Germany desires only
national prosperity and national freedom. 99
Unfortunately for Sir Roger Casement, this statement would be his greatest
success on behalf of revolutionary Irish nationalism. His other goal would not be
actualized, for the Irish Brigade was dead in the water from the outset. He naïvely
believed he could get non-commissioned officers- many who served with their regiment
for ten years or more- to desert their regiments to fight against the British in Ireland.100
Sir Roger Casement’s subsequent involvement with the IRB and the Clan na Gael would
be further degraded by John Devoy’s distrust of Casement. While Casement’s mission to
Germany was ultimately a failure, Casement’s publicity value to the Irish nationalist
cause was not yet depleted. The Clan’s policy and program to agitate for Irish
independence from America would not have been nearly as publicized without the
involvement of Sir Roger Casement.
The failing gasps of the Irish parliamentary position in America created a void
that the Clan rushed to fill. The disenchantment with a moderate, constitutional solution
to the Irish question grew more pronounced. To profit from this entirely new
demographic that joined the cause, the Clan needed to create a new organization that
operated publicly, in order to combat the political elites’ belief that the majority of the
Irish in America still supported John Redmond and Home Rule. Accordingly, the Clan
began planning a convention that would bring together prominent Irish Americans from
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all over the United States. This planning would occupy the last quarter of 1915, even as
plans for a future rebellion moved from rhetoric to reality.
Devoy and the Clan sought to influence elite state officials such as the German
Foreign Office to facilitate a collaboration between the German government and their
own Clan na Gael/ IRB. With the help of the prestigious convert, Sir Roger Casement,
the Clan and the Irish Republican Brotherhood cooperated with Germany to agitate for
Irish independence. Although the alliance was covert, Devoy kept the Gaelic American
decidedly pro-German, consistently keeping British faults and failures before his reading
public. The Clan’s mission was deeply indebted to the failures of John Redmond’s wartime policy of utmost cooperation with the British government. The failure of
implementation of Home Rule, and its indefinite postponement aligned these failures
squarely with Redmond and his Irish Party. The war’s duration further exacerbated
Redmond’s woes, for recruiting amongst the Irish was already fraught with political
quagmires. Redmond’s recruiting activities further strained his tenuous grasp on the
moderate Irish and Irish American majorities. The defections from the Redmondite
position can be traced to his war-time program of accommodation, and the Clan was
quick to capitalize. The stagnation of the United Irish League in America also contributed
to Redmond’s faltering appeal to Irish Americans, and by 1915 the organization was
essentially shuttered.
The Clan and Irish Republican Brotherhood maintained their coordination
throughout 1915, in fact, their partnership became even more productive with the greater
funds being collected via Clan dues. Devoy was able to send regular amounts to fund the
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IRB, and couriers carried it across the Atlantic to fund arms for the IRB.101 The split in
the Irish Volunteers actually created a tighter, more cohesive group that was not
sympathetic to Redmond, and this brand of loyalty was crucial as the Irish Party lost
ground, and the revolutionaries gained it. Plus, the Irish Volunteers were deeply
infiltrated at all levels by the IRB, so they were most assuredly quasi-rebels, whether they
realized it or not.102
1915 activated several currents that pulsed steadily below the surface in Irish
nationalism, but now emerged full-tide. In 1915, the Clan maintained its steadfast
opposition to anything short of Irish independence, but they were aided by outside world
events that actually increased its effectiveness: the continuing World War, the lack of an
effective Home Rule/ Redmond voice in the Irish American press, public relations
symbolism such as O’Donovan Rossa’s funeral, and John Redmond’s blind allegiance to
his own war-time policy. The Clan looked ahead to 1916 with greater resources, stronger
allies, and a forthcoming rebellion. In 1916, the revolutionaries in Ireland would rise.
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CONCLUSION
TIDAL WAVE (1916)

Coinciding with the newer, more republican Irish American sentiment, the Clan
na Gael issued a call for the leaders of Irish America to join together in New York City in
March of 1915 for an “Irish Race Convention.” Lest this convention’s goals be
misunderstood, the Gaelic American trumpeted its purpose clearly on its front page: “No
Man Not in Favor of Complete Irish Freedom Need Apply For Admission.” When Devoy
rose to speak, he quieted the crowd, but only spoke blandly of “imprudent speech.” But a
quick perusal of the slightly buried article in the Gaelic American on the establishment of
the Friends of Irish Freedom, a new public group dedicated to Irish independence,
illuminates Devoy’s greater accomplishment: the officers, directors, and executives of the
Friends of Irish Freedom were nearly all Clan na Gael men. Perhaps Devoy’s rare
reserve was because he knew what the gathered conventioneers did not: a rebellion in
Ireland was less than six weeks away.
The moderate Irish position gradually ebbed away, giving way to a flooding
current of Irish republicanism. In 1916, the Clan channeled the newly republican
sentiment into one great movement for Irish independence. The Clan’s vigorous public
relations effort in Irish America’s media, combined with foreign relations interventions at
the state level, and intimate collaboration with the Irish Republican Brotherhood marked
the great final thrust for Irish independence. The most direct contribution the Clan made
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to the Easter Rising in Dublin, April 24, 1916 was their unwavering fundraising efforts.
The political revolution could not have commenced without the economic support of the
hard currency provided by the Clan. The sustained cost of the resistance over the
previous twenty years of activism was possible only through the Clan’s dues, and
fundraising appeals made directly to the upwardly mobile Irish Americans that made up
the Gaelic American’s readership. The Easter Rising was the culmination of the Clan’s
financial work for the previous twenty years.
Through the coordination of the Clan na Gael and the Irish Republican
Brotherhood, the previous four years witnessed greater success in recruitment and
fundraising for both organizations. The IRB leadership was well-known to their
counterparts- many of the Irishmen travelled extensively to America on fundraising trips
for various organizations. Padraig Pearse had a personal relationship with Devoy and
Cohalan, Thomas Clarke was Devoy’s personal secretary in New York several years
earlier.103 The close relationships on both sides of the Atlantic helped foster the trust that
allowed the two organizations to operate and function nearly independently, but with the
same goal. The collaboration between the two groups was nearly flawless, particularly
considering the Atlantic that separated them. Both groups learned from the prior mistakes
of the Fenians, and operated as cells, with very little overlap between them. Such
operational security was obligatory, for the IRB was a separatist movement the British
government suppressed ruthlessly. Even more, the British were adept at infiltrating the
Irish independence groups, and Irish republican history was rife with examples of traitors,
and double agents.
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For the IRB and the Clan to get this close to a rebellion without an internal leak
was a near miracle. To protect this conspiracy, the two groups only communicated via
ciphers in telegrams, and personal trans-Atlantic couriers. One such courier, Tommy
O’Connor, arrived at Devoy’s offices at the Gaelic American on February 5, 1916.
O’Connor was a frequent courier between the IRB and the Clan; he was a steward on a
Cunard liner, and thus travelled between the United States and Ireland without suspicion.
O’Connor handed a sealed envelope to Devoy. The enclosed ciphered message was from
the Supreme Council of the IRB. It read:
We have decided to begin action on Easter Sunday. We must have your arms and
munitions in Limerick between Good Friday and Easter Saturday. We expect
German help immediately after beginning action. We might be compelled to
begin earlier. 104
It was less than three months away. The IRB completely infiltrated the Irish Volunteers,
but they still lacked adequate arms. Although Devoy sent over $100,000 to Ireland and
the IRB in the last six months, it was still not enough to fund a successful gun-running
operation beneath British noses. There was much work to be done. This work required
the German conspirators.
The Clan’s German alliance/conspiracy was the most delicate of their threepronged campaign for Irish independence. The advent of World War One made any Irish
overtures immediately treasonous, therefore Irish Americans would have to take the lead
in any advances made to the German government. Sir Roger Casement was supposed to
be the personal link between the Clan quasi-officially, and the German government.
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Casement, the trophy convert to Irish republicanism, was in Berlin to raise his “Irish
Brigade.” His failure to do so made Casement a liability. Further, Casement’s travelling
companion, one Adler Christiansen, hectored Devoy for money constantly from the time
of his association with Casement. An exchange between Joseph McGarrity and Devoy
reveals Devoy’s suspicions towards Christiansen, whom is referred to as “the nurse.”
Dear Joe,
I have got two reports on the nurse. On the first day he did
not turn up at the house at all. On the second he came out
late looking very dissipated and went over to NY, where he
turned back and forward, evidently to avoid being
followed, met very shady looking men, went into barrooms
resorted by a gang, stood looking into store windows
mostly jewelry- for the evident purpose of seeing if there
was any one on the other side of the street watching him,
and acted in every way like a professional criminal. Then
he returned to Jersey and was lost.
A saloonkeeper from his own country has kept for him a
passport under another name three years ago, on which he
returned. The places he visited are quiet gambling resorts.
The y noted the anchor on his hand.
Everything indicates that he is an old hand at this sort of
life. One of the men after him is his countryman….
Yours truly,
J.D.105
Clearly, Devoy felt that using Clan resources, i.e. manpower, to follow the “nurse” to
establish his guilt was worth the expense. It is also worthwhile to note that Joseph
McGarrity believed that Casement was the second coming of Wolfe Tone. For Devoy to
so pointedly provide surveillance on Casement’s companion indicates he was desperately
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trying to establish the unreliability of Casement’s judgment via his choice of companion.
Particularly so, since Casement was in Germany under the imprimatur of the Clan/IRB,
and privy to some of the most secret of plans. Devoy’s misgivings towards Casement
extended to keeping him isolated in Berlin while the most delicate of preparations were
being made for the rebellion. In fact, Casement was so disillusioned by the Germans by
this point that he decided a rebellion was pure folly and would result in an Irish
slaughterhouse. Unfortunately for Devoy and the Clan/IRB, Casement’s activities were
the least of their worries: British intelligence cracked the German diplomatic codes and
were fully aware of the conspiracy between German-American-Irish collaborators. Yet
again, the Irish and Irish Americans were outmaneuvered at the highest levels.
The Clan’s public relations goals and messaging necessitated a broadly supported,
public organization to assemble the various Irish American groups that expressed their
support for the Irish independence movement. Accordingly, the Clan spearheaded a call
for an “Irish Race Convention,” a gathering of the top Irish American leadership: “Over
the signature of 350 well-known Irish American leaders, an invitation was sent out on 8
February inviting some 2,300 reliable Irish Americans to attend.”106 Attendees were
expected to march in lockstep with its stated mission: the independence of Ireland. Joseph
McLaughlin, national president of the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH), expressed the
new nationalist fervor succinctly in a letter to John Devoy: “Rest assured, I am strongly
opposed to admitting any but those whose sentiments are in accord with ours. The
Convention will neither be the time nor the place to argue who is right, or who is wrong.
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We’re right, and let the other fellows keep away.”107 The AOH best exemplified the
change in middle of the road Irish Americans, for they previously supported Home Rule,
and represented the conservative Irish American majority. However, the combination of
the world war, John Redmond’s mishandling of the Irish political situation, and the Irish
American reaction to nativist claims of “dual loyalties” created a decidedly more
republican spirit in Irish Americans. The Gaelic American publicized the Convention on
page one the day of its opening, predicting it would “be a success beyond the most
sanguine expectations of its promoters. The question they [the promoters] are trying to
solve now is whether the large hall in which the Convention is to be held can hold all
who will come.”108 When the convention opened, it was in an “atmosphere of fervid
enthusiasm.”109 Temporary Chairman Justice John W. Goff also provided the keynote
speech of the Convention.
The Clan’s public relations efforts and fundraising were activated and supported
by the creation of the new public organization, the Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF). The
FOIF would become the face of the revolutionary Irish American organizations. The
FOIF was completely saturated with Clan members, and “of the seventeen members of
the executive committee, fifteen were members of the Clan.”110 While Victor Herbert
was elected president of the new organization, the real levers of power were operated by
Judge Daniel C. Cohalan, long-time member of the Executive Council of the Clan na
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Gael. Cohalan was also one of the very few men that John Devoy trusted implicitly, and
their partnership spanned the two decades of the Clan’s campaign to influence Irish
Americans into supporting Ireland’s independence. Steeped in Clan na Gael ideology and
adherents, one finds the FOIF constitution unsurprising:
…Today the alert and masterful enemies of England realize that for the peace of
the world England must be deprived of mastery and domination over Ireland…
We appeal to the Concert of the Powers, and particularly to America, if she be
represented in such Council, to recognize that Ireland is a European and not a
British island; to appreciate that its complete independence and its detachment
from the British Empire are vital to the freedom of the seas… and we demand in
the name of liberty and of the small nationalities that Ireland may be cut off from
England and restored to her rightful place among the nations of the earth.111
Coverage from the Gaelic American and Irish World was uniformly ecstatic, but a
leavening measure of public opinion can be provided by the New York Times coverage of
the same event. On the second day of the convention, the Times bemoaned the rhetoric of
the speakers, taking particular issue with the claim that “Ireland’s manhood… was being
dragged [into the British Army] by force, starvation, or deceit.” The column went further“the best comment on this theory is the fact that, two months ago, there were nearly
300,000 Irishmen in the British Army, 145,000 who volunteered in Ireland…A fine
compliment to those brave men, fighting for liberty and democracy-to say that ‘force,
starvation or deceit’ has made them its victims.”112
Naturally, John Redmond and the Home Rulers disowned the proceedings in New
York City, and their Irish American counterparts denounced the conference, and resolved
“…The Irish in Ireland are not contract breakers. Ever since O’Connell’s day they have
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fought for Home Rule (first as ‘Repeal of the Union’). Now that it is granted them, they
are keeping their part of the contract. They have sent 142,000 of their sons, voluntarily
and without ‘force, starvation, or deceit’ to the front, and are adding to that force at the
rate of 1,000 a week.”113 Yet no matter how the moderate Home Rule position protested,
the sheer energy and thunder of the Irish independence movement drowned out the more
muted, traditional Home Rule stance. The Clan was succeeding, not through the success
of their public relations campaign necessarily, but because they were ever alert to
advantageous shifts in public opinion, and ever quick to exploit them. The creation of the
Friends of Irish Freedom gave the Clan a public platform for operations, and most
importantly- a fundraising conduit. Less than two weeks after its inception, the FOIF
raised sufficient funds to enable Devoy to send $10,000 to the IRB via trans-Atlantic
courier.
Four weeks later, Irish rebels rose in Dublin. The severe constraints on
communications created by the reliance on trans-Atlantic couriers between the IRB and
the Clan led to garbled, incorrect information crossing both directions. The dates of the
German infiltration of the weapons so desperately needed for the rebellion were
alternately placed between Easter Friday, Saturday and Sunday. The lack of precision in
logistics did not just extend to a German distribution of weapons- John Devoy’s own
estimate of Irish republican strength was grossly exaggerated by his reliance on the
support of the Redmondite faction of the Irish Volunteers, whom Devoy promised would
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also rise in rebellion when the time came.114 Casement did attempt to stop the rebellion:
put ashore by German submarine, he was captured on Good Friday. The British navy
intercepted the German trawler carrying the arms meant for the rebellion, and the
Germans scuttled the boat, sending the weapons to the bottom of the sea. Rather than
cancel the rebellion altogether, the Military Council of the IRB decided to go ahead after
a twenty-four-hour postponement. The Rising began on Easter Monday, Aril 24, 1916. It
was crushed by the following Sunday.
The Clan na Gael held the torch of Irish independence aloft in America for over
thirty years. From 1912-1916, the Clan activated a tri-segmented campaign to agitate for
Irish independence: public relations promotions, collaboration with the IRB, and
interventions with head-of-state actors on both sides of the Atlantic. The pages of the
Gaelic American and Irish World highlighted the public relations segment of the
campaign. These weeklies also allowed the Clan na Gael to promote the massive
demonstrations, conventions, and meetings that spurred Irish American donations in
support of the Irish independence movement. The Irish Race Convention in 1916
officially repudiated the parliamentary party politics of Home Rule and John Redmond,
collected the cream of Irish American leadership to provide a mandate for Irish
independence, and created the Friends of Irish Freedom. The FOIF was the leading
advocate of Irish independence for the following ten years.
Although the Rising was a political failure in the short term, it ultimately paved
the way for an independent Ireland. The Rising would not have been possible without the
financial support of the Clan na Gael. However, the Clan’s collaboration with the IRB
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was successful. The ability to create a trans-oceanic partnership, given the constraints
posed by secrecy and “modern” communications, boded well for future activities. The
Irish Republican Brotherhood would outlive the Rising, although the majority of its
leadership was executed in British reprisals. But there would be other leaders.
The conspiracy between Germans and Irish and Irish Americans was also
ultimately unsuccessful. But it showed the confidence with which Irish Americans were
now operating on behalf of Irish independence. The advent of World War One provided a
useful banner to gather American dissidents under- the most vocal advocates of American
neutrality were the two largest immigrant groups in America: the Germans and Irish.
They became natural allies, aligned through their mutual distaste of the British. The Clan
exploited this organic partnership and extended it further, always maneuvering to give
Irish independence the greatest advantage. The apex of the Clan’s foreign relations
activities, the third segment of their campaign for Irish independence, was the covert
agreement between the German government and the IRB, facilitated by the Clan as a
quasi-neutral go-between.
When the twentieth century began, the Clan na Gael was a small, tightly-knit
group of oath-bound agitators for Irish independence. Rising from the ashes of the Fenian
Brotherhood, the Clan maintained the Fenian commitment to Ireland’s complete
separation from the British Empire. The first decade of the twentieth century witnessed
greater Irish American participation in foreign relations, yet the majority of moderate
Irish in America were content with a Home Rule solution to the Irish question. By the
1910’s, a new current was sweeping Ireland and America alike, and the Clan na Gael
worked tirelessly to harness the new spirit of Irish nationalism. The election of Woodrow
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Wilson in 1912 invigorated the Irish American opposition, who saw Wilson’s
Anglophilia as a direct threat. As the winds of war swept over Europe, the Clan seized the
opportunity presented by Europe’s bloodbath to relentlessly advocate neutrality. By 1915,
the Great War entangled America via the huge loans secured by the Allied Powers.
Neutrality was becoming a lost hope. Nonetheless, the Clan persisted in their efforts,
joining forces with German Americans overtly, and the German government covertly,
with the motto “England’s loss is Ireland’s gain.” As long as America remained officially
neutral, such agitation could not be labeled treasonous or unpatriotic. The Clan was aided
in their fight against Home Rule by an unlikely and accidental ally: the Ulster Unionists
in Ireland were also virulently opposed to Home Rule, and worked just as assiduously to
kill it. When the Unionists formed the Ulster Volunteer Force to “protect the Union,” the
Irish nationalists felt perfectly justified in forming their own similar organization.
Additionally, by 1915, the war-time policies of John Redmond and his Irish Party
repelled Irish Americans, who felt that Redmond betrayed Ireland and the Irish by first
accepting postponement of Home Rule, and then promoting Irish recruitment for the
British Army. The momentum that Redmond marshalled to force the Home Rule bill was
squandered primarily by the advent of war, and then by Redmond’s constant
appeasement to the British government. The politicization of the Irish Volunteers, and
Redmond’s subsequent takeover of that organization created a further breach in Irish
nationalist sentiment. The tide decidedly shifted, and the moderate Irish position
gradually ebbed away, giving way to a flooding current of Irish republicanism. In 1916,
the Clan channeled the newly republican sentiment into one great movement for Irish
independence. The Clan’s vigorous public relations effort in America’s media, combined
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with foreign relations interventions at the head-of-state level, and intimate collaboration
with the Irish Republican Brotherhood marked the great final thrust for Irish
independence.
The Easter Rising on Monday, April 24, 1916 was the culmination of the Clan’s
work for the previous twenty years. The Rising was an abject failure. But the theme of
the Clan’s exploitation of outside events to the benefit of the cause of Irish independence
continued. Through the efforts of John Devoy and the Clan na Gael in the years 19121916, Irish American opinion and the Irish American Roman Catholic hierarchy were
persuaded that only an independent, republican Ireland was an acceptable political
solution to the “Irish Question.” The wake of the Rising and America’s entry into the war
both advanced the tide of Irish independence. It soon became a tidal wave.
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